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118.800 MHz: Ottawa Tower 
AC452: "Ottawa Tower, Air Canada 452 is 10 miles back on the left visual 32" 
ATC: "Air Canada 452 altimeter is 30.05" 
AC452: "30.05, Air Canada 452" 5 
ATC: "Air Canada 452 is cleared to land runway 32, winds 340 at 5 to 10" 
AC452: "Cleared to land, Air Canada 452" 
ATC: "Air Canada 452 contact ground 1-2-1 decimal 9" 
AC452: "Air Canada 452"1 
There is an art, and a science, to aviation. Not only do pilots need to understand the finer 10 
details of lift, drag, and thrust, they must master the process of working within a global system of 
regulations, norms, and procedures. This international model of commerce has been crafted over 
the last century by teams of regulators, governments, and individuals working together to unify 
the world under the aegis of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). From its 
origins in the post-war peace conferences after the first World War to its modern-day incantation 15 
formed after the second, the ICAO now forms the basis of the entire conversation above between 
Air Canada Flight 452 and the Air Traffic Control Tower at Ottawa International Airport. From 
unit standardization, radio frequencies and airline callsigns to airport codes, operating 
procedures, and communications standards, the ICAO is responsible for the way we see and 
interact with aviation today. 20 
 
1 “Takeoff to Touchdown,” Peter Ivakitsich, accessed November 23, 2020, http://www.canairradio.com/ttt.html. 
 2 
Although the ICAO has received relatively little scholarly attention, the creation of this 
international organization for aviation standardization is a shining example of the power of 
positive diplomacy from both rank-and-file diplomats as well as world leaders over the span of 
40 years. The hard work of multiple nations, like the United States, Great Britain, France, and 
Canada, created a new system from scratch. Coupled with the founding of the United Nations, 25 
the International Civil Aviation Organization provides for ongoing peace and coordination in the 
air.  
 
Regulating a Nascent Industry 
The International Civil Aviation Organization was not the international community’s first 30 
attempt at regulating civil aviation. The 1899 Hague Peace Conference marked the first time the 
governments of the world mentioned regulating airborne devices.2 Captain William Crozier, who 
was the United States delegate to the Hague, wrote that those on a military subcommittee 
intended to ban the use of “balloons or similar new machines” as a platform for weapons.3 The 
conference framed air rights, both in the early 1900s and into the future, as subject to a strong 35 
dose of international regulation, especially by the great powers of the world. Fortunately, the 
delegation at the Hague did foresee the rapid development in airspace technology that was 
coming, but they could not have predicted the emergence of new technologies so rapidly. The 
conference even attempted to ban automatic weapons for future warfare.4 The regulations on 
airborne weaponry had a built-in self-destruct timer in 5 years, all but guaranteeing a drawn out 40 
 
2 Geoffrey Best, “The 1899 Hague Conference and What Came After,” International Affairs 75, no. 3 (1999): 626.  
3 The Avalon Project. “Peace Conference at the Hague 1899: Report of Captain Crozier to the Commission of the 
United States of America to the International Conference at the Hague Regarding the Work of the First Committee 
of the Conference and its Sub-committee,” accessed October 3, 2020, 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hag99-05.asp. 
4 Best, International Affairs, 626.  
 3 
fight over the future of airspace security and sovereignty.5 By the time of the First World War, 
there had been a couple of unsuccessful attempts to regulate the air. The onset of the war gave 
riuse to new efforts to impose controls on the skies. 
The history of civil aviation stretches all the way back to before the Wright Brothers’ first 
flight in Kitty Hawk. In 1901, The New York Times ran an editorial speculating about the future 45 
of a commercial air-bound transportation service. “Is the airship coming?,” it reads, speaking to 
the boundless potential that ownership and control of the air could bring to a nation, and to the 
capitalists that chose to pursue it.6 When the Wright Brothers got airborne for those 12 seconds 
on the coast of North Carolina, they made all future development possible.7  
Across the Atlantic, too, the air race was taking off. After the Kitty Hawk successes, French 50 
pioneers of aviation were driven to compete for the sake of national pride.8 By the end of 1906, 
Brazilian transplant Alberto Santos-Dumont had successfully completed the first flight of a 
heavier-than-air machine in Europe – an accomplishment that earned him a monetary prize, as 
well as instant fame across two continents.9  
Most history books, as well as reporting at the time, credit the Wright Brothers with the 55 
first powered flight, but because of the monumental stakes and fame that came along with the 
title, controversy soon followed. An article in Popular Mechanics in 1981 challenged the 
Wrights’ assertions, arguing that German immigrant Gustav Whitehead was actually the first to 
accomplish the powered flight of a heavier-than-air machine in 1901, nearly two years before the 
 
5 Ibid., 626. 
6 Editorial Board, “The Dream of Aerial Flight,” The New York Times, September 4, 1901, https://nyti.ms/39x1ywO. 
7 Tom Crouch, First Flight: The Wright Brothers and the Invention of the Airplane. Washington, D.C.: United 
States Department of the Interior, n.d.: 45-46. 
8 Peter Bakewell, “On Pioneering Wings in France,” Southwest Review 95 no. 3 (2010): 480. 
9 Ibid., 484 
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Kitty Hawk experiments.10 Alberto Santos-Dumont also made claims to the title in 1906, though 60 
his claim was based on the lack of a stabilizing launching rail.11 The rail, which was utilized in 
most early flights to supplement wheels for takeoff, made it easier to go straight and gain the lift 
required for takeoff. Even during the launch of the fledgling aviation industry, standards and 
protocols were unclear and disputed. Early attempts at international regulation, like a meeting in 
Paris in 1910, were generally unsuccessful.12 Paris was held in response to incidents of 65 
international border crossings, like when a French pilot crossed the English Channel for the first 
time in 1909 and nobody knew if he was allowed to do such a thing.   
Many “firsts” took flight in the years after the Wrights found the key to taking and 
sustaining heavier-than-air flight. By 1908, pilots were taking passengers, and more and more 
people around the world trained their sights on flying machines.13 As early aviators shattered 70 
altitude, speed, and distance records at an astounding pace, commercial aviation became a real 
possibility. In 1914, St. Petersburg, Florida played host to the first scheduled commercial flight, 
a 23 minute jaunt across Tampa Bay with just one passenger aboard.14 By 1918, the air was 
being used for a litany of commercial purposes; from ferrying mail across continents to bringing 
passengers and critical cargo across oceans, aviation was replacing more antiquated modes of 75 
transport. 
 
10 Roy Bongartz Jr., “Was Whitehead First?,” Popular Mechanics, December 1981, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=9tkDAAAAMBAJ&lpg=PA73&pg=PA68#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
11 “Progress of Mechanical Flight,” Flight International Magazine, January 2, 1919, 
https://archive.org/stream/Flight_International_Magazine_1909-01-02-pdf#page/n9/mode/2up. 
12 John Cobb Cooper, “The International Air Navigation Conference, Paris 1910” 19, no. 2 (Spring 1952): 128. 
13 Evelyn Charles Vivian, A History of Aeronautics, 1920, 102, https://eds-a-ebscohost-
com.libproxy.trinity.edu/eds/ebookviewer/ebook/bmxlYmtfXzEwMzc2MDBfX0FO0?sid=9b05e66b-49b0-444b-
97e2-b8921d74f98a@sdc-v-sessmgr03&vid=5&format=EB&rid=1. 
14 “Air Liner Begins Trips; Service Installed in Florida, First Passenger Paying $400 at Auction.,” The New York 
Times, January 2, 1914, 
http://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1914/01/02/101719512.html?pageNumber=1. 
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This period of rapid technological improvement brought government interest to the possibilities 
of aviation. The British, French, and German governments held various competitions (at great 
expense) in search of a functional military aircraft. The British War Office, in particular, laid out 
requirements “distinctly more onerous than those of the French trials,” requiring 350 pounds of 80 
weight capacity and 3 hours of flight time among other statistics, which was a substantial feat at 
the time but still a far cry from the expectations placed on aircraft just 10 years down the road.15 
The search was a monumental step in aviation technology. 
In his anthology of British aviation history, E. Charles Vivian summarized the situation 
by writing, “all pre-war records of endurance, speed, and climb went by the board, as the race for 85 
aerial superiority went on.”16 This interpretation could not have been any more correct. European 
empires, and those countries desiring to become empires, were on the war path, and their 
imperial competition led them not just toward the Great War, but also on an unstoppable climb to 
battles over air superiority and control. The 1899 Hague conference, where our story of aviation 
regulation history starts, had been established in part to provide for disarmament and the 90 
prevention of future hostilities perpetrated by airborne machines—and it had failed.17 
Nonetheless, the conferences proved one thing: despite the best intentions of all countries to act 
in a humanitarian manner and pursue more balanced warfighting techniques that preserved life as 
much as possible, there was little interest in weakening the power structure that existed in Europe 
at the time.  95 
 
15 “The War Office Competition,” Flight Magazine, December 23, 1911, 23, 
https://archive.org/details/Flight_International_Magazine_1911-12-23-pdf/page/n23/mode/2up. 
16 Vivian, A History of Aeronautics, 115. 
17 Nobou Hayashi, “The Role and Importance of the Hague Conferences: A Historical Perspective,” United Nations 
Institute for Disarmament Research, 2017, 3, https://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-role-and-
importance-of-the-hague-conferences-a-historical-perspective-en-672.pdf. 
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At the close of the first World War, the Allied powers knew that they would have a 
significant amount of power when determining the future of aviation. But how best to regulate 
civil aviation matters remained up in the air. The Paris Peace Conference, convened to provide 
for long-lasting peace in Europe and around the world, sought to establish international 
cooperative treaties to make peace possible.18 While the League of Nations is certainly the name 100 
that people remember for overarching international organizations, civil aviation was also 
addressed through the International Commission for Air Navigation (ICAN). Established through 
the Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, the ICAN became the regulatory 
body for non-war-related matters of the air.  
One of the most important matters of discussion at Paris was to determine the sovereignty 105 
of the air. French lawyer and one of the first aviation law experts Paul Fachiulle, envisioning 
discussions of the future, asked, “states have a terrestrial territory and maritime territory. Do they 
also have an aerial territory?”19 This was an increasingly central issue for many of the great 
powers. After a significant investment in aerial navigation and aviation technology throughout 
the first World War, there was no doubt that “aircraft had already become, even in its embryonic 110 
forms, a potent weapon not only of reconnaissance and espionage, but of attack.”20 The need to 
distinguish between civil and military traffic and ensure that there was a right to innocent 
passage in worldwide airspace was critical to international security (hence its appearance at 
Paris) but also to international commerce. 
 
18 Woodrow Wilson, “Make This League of Nations a Vital Thing,” International Organization 10, no. 4 (1956): 
525–28, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2704447. 
19 Stuart Banner, Who Owns The Sky: The Struggle to Control Airspace from the Wright Brothers On (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2008), 43; Arthur K. Kuhn, “The Beginnings of an Aërial Law,” The 
American Journal of International Law 4, no. 1 (1910): 111, https://doi.org/10.2307/2186458. 
20 Oliver J. Lissitzyn, “The Diplomacy of Air Transport,” Foreign Affairs 19, no. 1 (October 1940): 157, 
https://doi.org/10.2307/20029053. 
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The concept of a right to international passage has its origins in 1906. At a meeting of the 115 
Institute of International Law in Ghent, a discussion was held at Fauchille’s suggestion 
surrounding the ownership of the air. There were three schools of thought presented: from 
Belgium, that there was no owner of the air; from Fauchille serving as the French delegate, who 
believed that there ought to be separate rules applied based on the altitude of travel; and from the 
British delegate, who put forth a proposal that nations had ultimate control of the airspace above 120 
their territory.21 The Institute ultimately landed on a proposal provided by Fauchille that dictated 
the air is free for all to use, but countries may regulate the airspace above their land to preserve 
national security and safety. This is the principle of “innocent passage” that continued to be a 
topic of conversation in the pre-war years: could countries regulate the air above them, and could 
different states determine their own non-congruent rules and make inter-state commerce nearly 125 
impossible? 
 
Aviation as part of the Paris Peace Conference 
Not much has been written about the proceedings of the aviation committee that met at 
Paris. As such, it is difficult to know exactly what happened behind closed doors in one of the 52 130 
different committees that were established to hash out a peace accord at the end of one of the 
deadliest wars in modern history. Despite this lack of context, the document that the commission 
produced is strikingly detailed and set forth the principles of international law that have applied 
to international aviation since its passing. This document, while not perfect, advanced the idea of 
air regulation and established critical standards for peace in the air. 135 
 
21 United States Department of State, Aspects of United States Participation in International Civil Aviation 
(Washington, D.C.: Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, 1948), 7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/2027/umn.31951001548212r. 
 8 
Up first for discussion was the principle of air sovereignty – who officially, really, truly 
controlled the air above a country’s sovereign territory? The preamble of the Convention for the 
Regulation of Aerial Navigation , released in October 1919 after its completion at Paris, says that 
those who signed believe “that the establishment of regulations of universal application will be to 
the interest of all” and that they want to “encourage the peaceful intercourse of nations by means 140 
of aerial communications.”22 Those 29 signatory countries were in search of a peaceful solution 
that would apply to peacetime civil aviation.23 The writing, though, was done by the 
Aeronautical Commission. Delegates from the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, and 
Japan had two delegates; Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, Greece, Portugal, Romania, and Serbia each 
had one delegate.24  145 
Because of its importance to the rest of the treaty, the question of sovereignty was 
addressed in the first article of the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation. Article 1 
of the Treaty laid out in very specific terms how every power, regardless of their presence at the 
convention, had “complete and exclusive sovereignty” of the airspace over their country. This 
resolution, according to aeronautics law pioneer Albert Roper, made the sovereignty of the air 150 
“no longer… a subject of discussion.”25 This was a global paradigm shift, especially on the part 
of the French delegation. In previous discussions about freedom of the air, Fauchille (the French 
delegate to these previous conferences) had supported true freedom with no state sovereignty, at 
 
22 “Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation,” The American Journal of International Law 17, no. 4 
(1923): 195, https://doi.org/10.2307/2212814. 
23 The signatory countries, in order of signature, are the United States, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, the British Empire, 
Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India, China, Cuba, Ecuador, France, Hellenes (Greece), Guatemala, 
Haiti, the Hedjaz (Saudi Arabia), Honduras, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, 
Roumania, Serbo-Croat-Slovenes, Siam, Czechoslovakia, and Uruguay. 
24 John Cobb Cooper, “United States Participation in Drafting Paris Convention 1919,” Journal of Air Law and 
Commerce 18, no. 3 (1951): 267, https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3519&context=jalc. 
25 Albert Roper, “The Organization and Program of the International Commission for Air Navigation (C.I.N.A.),” 
Journal of Air Law and Commerce 3, no. 2 (1932): 168, 
https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3684&context=jalc. 
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least at higher altitudes. At the conclusion of the war, the French commission for matters had 
apparently changed their tune; in late 1918, the Inter-Ministerial Commission of Civil 155 
Aeronautics adopted the theory of state sovereignty and pushed it forward at the 1919 Paris 
talks.26 While the remainder of the convention addresses “contracting” states, the worldwide 
nature of this article is notable. 
Articles 2 and 3, while not a broad worldwide article like Article 1, also had a substantial 
impact on the remainder of the treaty. While the Paris Peace Conference did not have any 160 
illusion that war would be prevented for all eternity, the purpose of the Convention was to 
address civil (non-military) air travel during peace time. The drafters underscored this with 
Article 2, which granted the right of innocent passage to all contracting states during 
peacetime.27 But like many other aspects of the Convention, this clause only applied to the 33 
ratifiers of the convention, and had weaknesses that will be discussed shortly. Notably, this list 165 
excluded the United States, the Soviet Union, Germany, and China. Latin America, which at the 
time did not have a major air wing, was largely excluded, and the vast majority of Africa was 
included by the nature of colonialism. The fractured nature of the conference resulted in an 
organization “which was never able to deal with international aviation on a world-wide basis.”28 
The practical challenges that the fragmented nature of the Convention posed were 170 
enormous. First, each country involved (as well as those who chose not to join in) had ambitious 
air goals – not only for economic and military purposes, but for national pride.29 Article 2, which 
 
26 United States Department of State, Aspects of United States Participation in International Civil Aviation, 8. 
27 “Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation,” The American Journal of International Law, 198. 
28 United States Department of State, Aspects of United States Participation in International Civil Aviation, 1. 
29 Marc Dierikx, “Struggle for Prominence: Clashing Dutch and British Interests on the Colonial Air Routes, 1918-
42,” Journal of Contemporary History 26, no. 2 (1991): 333, https://www.jstor.org/stable/260794. 
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had theoretically given the right of innocent passage to civil aviation, was interpreted to exclude 
commercial civil aviation. 
Each contracting state undertakes in time of peace to accord freedom of innocent passage 175 
above its territory to the aircraft of the other contracting states, provided that the 
conditions laid down in the present convention are observed.30 
The ramifications of this interpretation were strict, immediate, and intensely damaging to 
the prospects of international commercial air transport. Under the article’s 1919 view, 
commercial airlines could only fly over other countries with three conditions: the aircraft 180 
followed the rest of the technical requirements laid out in the Convention, the state that 
controlled the territory below the air had to consent to the aircraft being there, and, of course, the 
aircraft must have been registered with a country that had ratified Paris.31 The groundwork for 
this interpretation was laid in Article 15, which required international airways to “be subject to 
the consent of the states flown over.”32 Large national airlines were a source of pride, and 185 
because the strategy of European states had been to claim territory around the globe, the 
traditional powers needed each other’s permission to get there with this new mode of transport.33 
The organization tasked with overseeing, coordinating and ruling on various issues of the 
air was established by the 1919 Convention. The International Commission for Air Navigation 
(ICAN), formed by Article 8 of the Paris Convention, was “intended to enhance the development 190 
of international civil aviation.”34 The French delegation, ever the opportunists, gave Paris the 
honor of playing host to the first meeting of the ICAN. Attendance at the first meeting of the 
 
30 “Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation,” The American Journal of International Law, 198. 
31 Dierikx, “Struggle for Prominence: Clashing Dutch and British Interests on the Colonial Air Routes, 1918-42,” 
334. 
32 “Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation,” The American Journal of International Law, 201. 
33 For a more comprehensive telling of the British-Dutch aviation rights clashes between 1918 and 1942, reference 
Dierikx’s “Struggle for Prominence.” 
34 David MacKenzie, ICAO: A History of the International Civil Aviation Organization (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2010), 15. 
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commission was included in the convention, too, particularly placing power in the hands of the 
traditional powers. The United States, France, Italy, Japan, and Britain were guaranteed two 
representatives (Britain was given more for each of its territories abroad, as well as India). An 195 
additional clause increased the powers of the world powers, saying that the group “shall have the 
least whole number of votes which, when multiplied by five, will give a product exceeding by at 
least one vote the total number of votes of all the other contracting states.”35 This clause gave the 
five powers an unchecked veto power and prevented any substantive changes from being made 
without their support. From the world powers’ point of view, though, this system was fantastic. 200 
Changes to aviation standards and laws could be done at will without opposition from smaller 
nations, whose aviation ambitions may have too much lift relative to their size and economic 
power. 
The ICAN was charged with a great deal of responsibilities as part of their charter. Not 
only were they responsible for the major legal issues and conflicts that took place over airspace 205 
and update the Paris Convention as members voted to do so, they had a litany of technical 
responsibilities as well. The Convention had included 8 annexes, labeled A through H, that 
spelled out every manner of technical provision. The convention and its annexes included every 
area of international air travel – from airport design to the customs process, the Commission was 
required to pass amendments and issue guidance on technical standards.36 The technical 210 
language was verbose and wide-ranging. A whole chapter of the 1919 convention was allocated 
to discussing the certification process of aircraft and flight crews, including provisions about the 
licensing procedures for aircraft radios. These minute details, exhaustive as they may have been 
for the delegations to produce, were crucial to the mission of the ICAN. The push for 
 
35 “Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation,” The American Journal of International Law, 204. 
36 “Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation,” The American Journal of International Law, 204. 
 12 
international standardization was just as critical, or more critical, than any economic clauses or 215 
changes. Aviation technology was rapidly progressing, and the longevity of aircraft forced 
regulations to be decisive and less prone to change. 
The power, and the fate, of the ICAN was directly connected to the League of Nations. 
The first time this connection presented itself was in the initial membership list. Because the 
League of Nations was established as part of the Paris Peace Conference, belligerent states were 220 
not allowed to join the League or the associated commissions. The Convention says that states 
who took part in the war were not allowed to join the organization until 1923, and even then, 
they must be admitted by three-fourths of the member states.37 Under the restrictive 
interpretations of Articles 2 and 15, as well as Article 5 (which restricted travel over contracting 
states to only travel done by planes registered by another contracting state) though, this severely 225 
limited the potential power of international aviation. Germany, for example, was unable to join 
the ICAN, and therefore nations surrounding Germany that needed to use their airspace were 
reticent to sign and adhere to the convention. Edward Warner, an American aviation expert, 
wrote in 1926 that the “special position of Germany in relation to commercial air transport that 
has lain at the root of most of the international difficulties of the last five years.”38  230 
The situation with Germany was a real problem. It is well known that Germany was 
given a relatively unfair deal at the close of the war. As a part the Treaty of Versailles, the Allied 
powers loaded Germany with reparations payments and strict arms controls, contributing to a 
deteriorating government beholden to the winners of the war. The original draft of the 
Convention had prevented individual states from permanent treaties with non-member states for 235 
 
37 Ibid., 207. 
38 Edward P. Warner, “International Air Transport,” Foreign Affairs 4, no. 2 (January 1926): 281, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/20028446. 
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the right of passage, saying that permissions for flight could only be given “by a special and 
temporary authorization.”39 But by necessarily excluding a majority of continental Europe that 
relied on German commerce with Article 5’s prevention of treaties with non-signatories, the 
ICAN had kneecapped its authority and its chance at a legitimate, expansive, organization. A 
first attempt at rules, passed in early May 1922, forced rigorous technical standards that made it 240 
nearly impossible for inter-continental aviation to survive. These “Nine Rules,” which applied to 
any aircraft in German airspace, were so stringent that “it would hardly have been possible to 
build an airplane which would fit those rules” and in essence prohibited any Allied transit over 
the center of the continent due to the proximity of the Alps mountain range.40 
So, in the first of multiple amendments eventually put forward over the ensuing two 245 
decades, the Commission advanced and approved a change to Article 5 in 1922 that expressly 
allowed individual treaties between two countries.41 The changes to the Convention did not 
apply, though, until all members of ICAN had ratified the changes. The path to ratification was 
long, but eventually, the new language went into effect in December 1926. This change enabled 
ICAN members to sign individual conventions with Germany, and by early 1930, most of the 250 
powers behind the Convention had done so. 
Notably missing from the meetings of the International Commission for Air Navigation 
was the United States. Because the fate of the Paris Convention and the associated Commission 
were directly tied to that of the League of Nations, the United States had copious amounts of 
debate surrounding whether to join or not. There were three sides to the debate in the Senate: 255 
those that stood for the Treaty of Versailles and believed in its ratification; those that believed 
 
39 “Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation,” The American Journal of International Law, 199. 
40 Warner, “International Air Transport,” 283. 
41 Alfred Wegerdt, “Germany and the Aerial Navigation Convention at Paris, October 13, 1919,” Journal of Air Law 
1, no. 1 (1930): 2. 
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the Treaty had flaws, but were still in favor of the broader ideas contained within it; and those 
known as irreconcilables, who were opposed to the concept of the League of Nations as a whole. 
William Borah, one of Idaho’s senators, was a leader of the irreconcilable movement.42 The fears 
that irreconcilables had about the Treaty of Versailles was the encroachment of an international 260 
organization on the rights of the federal government and the consequences those restrictions 
would have on the American people. Henry Cabot Lodge, the majority leader of the Republican 
party in the Senate at the time, was stuck between a rock and a hard place with his membership, 
but was very outspoken against the Treaty as written at Versailles. He believed that if the United 
States were to “fetter her in the interest through quarrels of other nations, if you tangle her in the 265 
intrigues of Europe, you will destroy her powerful good, and endanger her very existence.”43  
The hesitation to join the League of Nations by the United States undercut its power and 
efficacy, contributing to its ultimate demise. But if the Paris Convention hadn’t been attached to 
the League, could it have garnered the ratification of the United States? Quite possibly. Many of 
the reservationists were worried about giving up control and sovereignty to foreign nations or 270 
getting too involved in European affairs. But the Paris Convention and ICAN were both 
structured, at least initially, to prevent signatory countries from giving up any control to an 
international organization. The only domain where the ICAN had bounding authority was in 
technical and operational regulations, which did not threaten the national sovereignty and 
isolationism that the reservationists and the irreconcilables had sought. 275 
 
42 George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 429. 
43 Henry Cabot Lodge, “Treaty of Peace with Germany,” in Treaty of Peace with Germany, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1919), 16.  
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The United States gave its signature to the convention, but ultimately did not ratify it in 
line with the procedures established in Article I of the United States Constitution. But why was 
the United States opposed to adhering to the rules and procedures spelled out in the 1919 
Convention? Part of the reason for the rejection was its alignment with the new League of 
Nations, but the confusion around Article 15’s interpretations and the rights extended to foreign 280 
nations caused even more disagreement within the United States government. Reservations to 
treaties have been part of worldwide standard operating procedure, and when the United States 
signed the Paris Convention, they reserved their rights from Article 15.44 When the Paris 
Convention was up for revisions in 1929, the chairman of the United States Delegation William 
MacCracken, Jr. commented on the hesitancy of the United States government to ratify the 285 
original 1919 treaty. As he noted: 
The American delegation wishes to state that in making these remarks it is not making a 
reservation on behalf of the United States and is not declaring that its Government would 
refuse to ratify the Convention of 1919 merely because of Article 15. It merely wished to 
allow the other members of the Conference to profit by the experience acquired in its 290 
own country. 45   
While MacCracken does explicitly say that the presence of Article 15 did not prevent the United 
States Senate from ratifying the convention, he does remark earlier on in the speech that “a 
modification of this article would be likely to facilitate the adherence of the 1919 Convention of 
numerous states that have not yet joined it.” 295 
MacCracken gave this speech while he attended the extraordinary 1929 meeeting of the 
ICAN in Paris. The express purpose of the convention, as well as the invitation sent to the United 
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States, was to “facilitate the adherence of states which are not parties to the Convention.”46 The 
United States was among those non-adhering countries, but it was not alone. Another notable 
holdout, despite its acceptance into the organization in 1926, was Germany. While the paper 300 
itself has been lost to history, the Ministry of Communications for the German government 
released an article detailing why it had not been adhering to the standards laid out in the Paris 
Convention. Apparently, German leaders objected to the different sets of rules that various 
groups of countries had established.  
In 1926, the first of two less significant conferences was held to establish a different 305 
version of the aviation order. The Ibero-American Convention, held in Madrid with 21 countries 
in attendance, was nearly identical to the 1919 Paris document, including the name of the 
convention itself: the Ibero-American Convention on Air Navigation.47 By the ICAO’s own 
accounts, its function was to replicate the Paris Convention’s substance with one written by 
Spain to tie her to the Latin American and Caribbean countries she invited to Madrid. 310 
Unfortunately, only seven countries ever ratified the agreement, and by 1933, Spain and 
Argentina denounced the treaty and ratified the Paris Convention in its stead. 
The United States, similar to Spain in the Ibero-American Convention, wanted more 
control over their aviation destiny and more influence over their southern neighbors. They also 
valued their positive relations with the rest of the Western Hemisphere. In a letter from the 315 
Secretary of State to the American Delegation at the sixth Pan-American Conference in 1928, 
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Frank Kellogg wrote “the Pan American policy takes first place in our diplomacy.”48 So at the 
1928 meeting of countries from North and South America in Havana, the delegations hammered 
out a new agreement that would satisfy the growing desire for international aviation in the 
Americas. In many ways, this document was meant to address the perceived shortcomings of the 320 
Paris document by adding clarity to the issues of international air traffic. By Article XXI, the 
convention explicitly addresses the right for commercial air travel between the Pan-American 
states: 
The aircraft of a contracting state engaged in international air commerce shall be 
permitted to discharge passengers and a part of its cargo at one of the airports designated 325 
as a port of entry of any other contracting state, and to proceed to any other airport or 
airports in such state for the purpose of discharging the remaining passengers and 
portions of such cargo and in like manner to take on passengers and load cargo destined 
for a foreign state or states, provided that they comply with the legal requirements of the 
country over which they fly, which legal requirements shall be the same for native and 330 
foreign aircraft engaged in international traffic and shall be communicated in due course 
to the contracting states and to the Pan American Union. 49 
In essence, the Havana convention gave the United States the control it wanted over 
commercial aviation. By late February 1928, commercial aviation across the Americas was free 
to proceed with little restriction or governmental interference. By 1930, however, with multiple 335 
treaties applying to civil aviation around the world, there was a desire to centralize them through 
the rehashing of the 1919 Paris Convention. In David MacKenzie’s history of the ICAO, he 
remarks on how “there was little desire to loosen each state’s complete sovereignty over its 
airspace.”50 The world turned on its head, however, when Germany began its march toward 
creating the Second World War, directing international efforts away from civil aviation and 340 
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toward building any hope of lasting peace in Europe. All of a sudden, the status quo was good 
enough while the Western European powers rearmed and redeveloped military aircraft for the 
nearly-inevitable looming conflict.51 
 
1944 and the Chicago Convention 345 
Few world leaders viewed the new “United Nations” organization as a threat to national 
sovereignty. Instead, the organization was dedicated “to save succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”52 By 
exerting international influence through treaties and standardization, the United Nations sought 
to eliminate many of the stumbling blocks that had caused so much strife in the fallout from 350 
World War I. 
The outbreak of World War II caused havoc to wash over foreign affairs, and civil 
aviation regulations were not immune. Passengers and non-military cargo transportation across 
Europe nearly ceased, and economic power pivoted from the traditional powers and cemented 
itself within the United States. Nowhere was this more clear than in the air. The United States 355 
was largely untouched on its soil, so domestic air travel faced much less of an impact.53 In 
addition, American aviation companies were responsible for providing tools of war to European 
allies – particularly transport planes. 
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Aviation was one area that needed immediate course-correction. In fact, the issue was so 
urgent that the Allied powers convened a wartime conference to discuss the future of 360 
international aviation. In March 1943, King George VI addressed his parliament, asserting that 
“some form of international collaboration will be essential if the air is to be developed in the 
interests of mankind as a whole, trade served, international understandings fostered and some 
measure of international security gained.”54 Realizing that international airpower was on the rise 
after the impressive aviation expenditures incurred by the war, the United Kingdom government 365 
reached out to Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s State Department to evaluate interest in a 
multinational convention to determine the post-war rules of the sky. On August 29, 1944, a 
convention was formally called for by the British and Canadian governments, to which the 
United States agreed.55 
The invitation list for Chicago, the site of these negotiations, was similar, though not 370 
identical to, the combination of the 1919 and 1928 gatherings in Paris and Havana respectively. 
All Allied countries taking part in the war were included, as well as officially neutral states like 
the Scandinavian nations and Switzerland; Argentina, given its alliance with and support of 
Germany, was not included in the guest list.56 The delegations were selected primarily because of 
their importance to air travel once Europe was liberated from Nazi control. Similar to other 375 
wartime conferences, the Axis powers were not included despite their importance in civil 
aviation on the European continent. This decision can be traced to the optimism of the Allied 
powers toward their success in the war; the invitation directly addresses this fact, saying: 
 
54 Proposal by the Delegation of the United Kingdom, Report on Conference to Technical Documents Book 1, Box 
2, Entry P24; General Records of the Chicago Conference on Intl Civil Aviation, 1943-1945, Record Group 43; 
National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD, 2. 
55 Letter to President – Report on Conference, Box 6, Entry P24, General Records of the Chicago Conference on Intl 
Civil Aviation, 1943-1945, Record Group 43; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD, 1. 
56 Polkowska, “The Development of Air Law,” 73; MacKenzie, ICAO: A History of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 25. 
 20 
The approaching defeat of Germany, and the consequent liberation of great parts of 
Europe and Africa from military interruption of traffic, sets up the urgent need for 380 
establishing an international civil air service pattern … so that all important trade and 
population areas of the world may obtain the benefits of air transportation as soon as 
possible, and so that the restorative processes of prompt communication may be available 
to assist in returning great areas to processes of peace.57  
With the exclusion of Germany, Austria, Italy, and Japan, 55 invitations requesting 385 
delegations to Chicago were sent out on September 11, 1944.58 The conference was slated to 
start on or around November 1, 1944.59 
After numerous omissions and diplomatic infighting had sent the Paris Convention to its 
demise, the Allied powers were keen to prevent the same mistakes from happening again. The 
British government took the first step, writing a white paper of policy proposals for the 390 
convention. Not only did this paper come as a surprise to United States leaders, the views 
expressed within it were non-starters for nations both large and small. Great Britain believed that 
previous treaties had focused too much on technical issues and not enough on economic 
dispersion. As the British Secretary of State for Air wrote in the white paper, “the growth of air 
transport was conditioned by political rather than economic considerations and its development 395 
as an orderly system of world communications was impeded.”60 Especially after the Dutch had 
defeated the British in the ugly battle over flying over territories, there was a strong desire to 
prevent political geography from stifling British air growth. 
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The white paper was a problem that had to be rectified, at least in theory. Not only had its 
publishing surprised the United States and Canada, the British parliament had also not had a 400 
chance to review and debate the policy. In a telegram from the United States Ambassador to the 
United Kingdom John Winant, he informed the Secretary of State that “several members of 
Parliament expressed their annoyance at the appearance of a White Paper on civil aviation before 
adequate debate in the House of Commons” and “there will be a demand that the subject be 
debated before Lord Swinton leaves for Chicago.”61 Despite the calls for additional debate, there 405 
was very little change to the British aviation policy. Just as they had proposed when calling for 
the convention, Great Britain desired an economic organization that could regulate the mainline 
routes and ensure that all nations had an equal chance to participate in the economics of the air. 
The new convention had to, according to the British delegation, “define the degree of freedom of 
the air to be enjoyed by the ratifying states” and also “define the international air routes which 410 
should be subject to international regulation.”62  
The United States had no desire to see international routes delegated and regulated by an 
economic body that had yet to be created. In a letter to President Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary 
of State Adolf Berle wrote that “the United States had made the point it could not delegate 
economic power to an international body except to carry out principles, agreements and law 415 
clearly agreed upon by governments.”63 The United States also wanted to protect the rights of 
their airmen. If the British delegation was successful in establishing traffic limits per country, 
American air travel would have to match that of Great Britain. Smaller nations, particularly the 
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Netherlands, were equally opposed to traffic limits. If states’ aviation ambitions exceeded the 
proportionate size of the country, then the future of air commerce was threatened.   420 
These white paper discussions formed a critical part of agenda-setting, and the two sides at the 
heart of these worldwide negotiations were being led by experienced diplomats. Berle served as 
the chairman of the United States delegation. Berle was not a traditional diplomat, but he was 
well educated and determined to “make history though politics” and on a “quest… to shape the 
history of ideas.”64 After matriculating into Harvard College at 14 and graduating from its law 425 
school 7 years later in 1916, he was the youngest graduate to emerge with his skillset. After a 
brief stint in the Army during World War I as a signal corps member, he entered the political 
landscape in earnest by joining Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s campaign as a policy advisor on 
credit and corporations. Though he had been a Republican early in his career, he pivoted away 
from party lines and called himself a “reform-minded political realist.”65 This belief carried him 430 
into FDR’s campaign and into Roosevelt’s famed brain trust, where he wrote “the manifesto of 
the New Deal” and propelled him into a leadership role in the new administration.66 But this 
leadership role was the “assistant secretary of nothing;” rather than having a specific policy area 
to focus on, Roosevelt deployed Berle where unconventional ideas were necessary.67  
This penchant for tackling anything, combined with his desire to work on less prominent 435 
but still critical issues of national importance, led Berle to an unconventional area in 1942: 
international civil aviation.68 Rather than compete with political giants on the restructuring of the 
global economy or the political systems that would keep the new world order in check, Berle 
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opted to focus on the future of international air travel. While he came to the table with next to no 
previous exposure to aviation, he knew two things: aviation was to be just as crucial to world 440 
peace as any new political structure; and the diplomacy of international civil aviation ought to be 
carried out in much the same fashion as the rest of Roosevelt’s foreign policy.69  
As then-Assistant Secretary of State Berle compiled a high-level team to address the 
future of world aviation, he did so with the support of both Roosevelt and Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull, the “father of the United Nations.”70 Joining Berle’s delegation to the Chicago 445 
Convention was an all-star group of political leaders: Josiah Bailey, the chairman of the Senate 
Commerce Committee; Owen Brewster, a member of the Senate Commerce Committee; Alfred 
Bulwinkle, a longtime member of the House of Representatives71; William Burden, the assistant 
secretary of Commerce for Air; Retired Rear Admiral Richard Byrd; Fiorello LaGuardia, the 
chairman of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defense; L. Welch Pogue, the 450 
chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board; Edward Warner, the vice chairman of the Civil 
Aeronautics Board; and Charles Wolverton, a member of the House of Representatives. In 
addition to the above formal delegation, there were a number of advisors comprising both the 
Department of War and the American aviation industry; Pan-Am, TWA, American Airlines, 
Pan-American Airways, and Chicago and Southern Airways (the largest carriers at the time) all 455 
had members of their leadership councils on the advisory group, as well as a representative of the 
National Aircraft War Production Council, which coordinated technical matters between aircraft 
manufacturers on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.72 
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On the other side of the bilateral negotiations at the start of the conference was Philip 
Cunliffe-Lister, usually referred to as Lord Swinton. Cunliffe-Lister was born into a military 460 
family and followed that path himself, joining the British army and serving throughout World 
War I. Before the war broke out, though, he obtained his law degree from Oxford. In 1918, he 
ran for and was elected to the House of Commons. Once elected, he served in a number of 
prominent roles throughout government, including the Secretary of the Overseas Trade 
Department, President of the Board of Trade, and Secretary of State for the Colonies.73 A 465 
conservative Member of Parliament, he was elevated to the House of Lords in 1935 and served 
the majority of the rest of his life in public service, including as the Minster for Civil Aviation 
during the Chicago Conference. 
The United States, in response to the British white paper, crafted a “summary of 
objectives favored by the United States of America with respect to post-war civil air transport.”74 470 
While the British and American points appeared at face value to be similar, there was substantial 
disagreement in regards to the role of a potential international organization. Where the Brits 
wanted a powerful organization that could make decisions for sovereign states, the U.S. 
delegation argued for a limited body that had two fundamental powers. The first was mostly 
technical, allowing for studies about “procedures and practices relating to safety regulations, 475 
flight procedure, airline accounting, dissemination of meteorological information, customs 
procedure, standardization of communications equipment and facilities and air navigation 
aids.”75 This first power did not come with much controversy, at least in its presence. Every 
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nation in attendance at Chicago agreed that for international air travel to function, the procedures 
that pilots were required to follow must be equivalent from nation to nation. Where the British 480 
and American proposals differed was in the division of economic power. The British white paper 
sought the “enlightened international direction” of an empowered international organization. In 
particular, the paper argued for an organization that could “maintain broad equilibrium between 
the world’s air transport capacity and the traffic offering” and “ensure equitable participation by 
the various countries engaged in international air transport.”76 The U.S. proposal, though, only 485 
gave the new organization the power to “collect complete information” regarding the economic 
performance of airlines. 
Chicago became the hub for more than 950 representatives in early November, with 
delegations of all shapes and sizes making an appearance. Some countries, like Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic, sent a single representative to Chicago, while core parts of the global 490 
power structure like France sent sizeable delegations.77 Regardless of delegation size, though, the 
most important component was their presence. The convention would only be successful if it was 
truly worldwide and every country adhered to the technical and economic aspects of civil 
aviation.  
One critical state, however, was missing on the first day: the Soviet Union. Though it had 495 
traveled all the way to Montreal as a final stop before Chicago, the Russian delegation instead 
decided to turn around and return home. Early in the morning on September 9th, before the 
official invitation had been dispatched to heads of state around the world, Secretary of State Hull 
sent a telegram to Ambassador Harriman in the Soviet Union. The message conveyed a sense of 
importance to the matters at hand. Hull wrote, “the Department desires that you explain to them 500 
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that since the calling of this Conference is of the utmost urgency, we have not followed the 
course which we ordinarily would of consulting them before hand nor did we consult any other 
nation. We trust that the Soviet Government will be in agreement with us with respect to the 
urgency of this matter.”78 Soviet leaders, though, were repulsed by the presence of some neutral 
countries. Spain, Portugal, and Switzerland were the countries in question, but because of their 505 
prominence in European airfare and their colonial powers elsewhere, Spain and Portugal were 
“highly important to development of international air networks.”79 The refusal by the Soviets 
was unexpected, too, as the United States had made it clear that the nations would be in 
attendance.80 In a show of how the United States viewed the conference, though, they still 
encouraged the group of Soviet aviation experts to remain at the conference “without 510 
participation directly or indirectly in the work of the conference” to be a liaison for Russian 
needs and opinions at Chicago.81 Under Secretary of State Edward Stettinius said that the show 
would go on, and the two core proposals put forward by the British and American delegations 
would still be used as the basis of discussions. 
The conference opened on November 1, 1944, in the Stevens Hotel in downtown 515 
Chicago.82 In all, of the 55 invitations sent to countries around the world, 53 were represented. 
Other than the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia had declined to send With the United States serving 
as hosts to the conference, they also had the privilege to select the temporary President of the 
Convention. Roosevelt unsurprisingly selected Berle to lead the convention initially, relying on 
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his skills as a diplomat and as an aviation generalist to achieve the freedoms that his 520 
administration sought for international aviation. Berle opened the discussions by reading a letter 
from President Roosevelt. The letter reflected the wartime nature of the conference, as well as 
the drive for international cooperation that drove the conference in the first place. Roosevelt 
wrote, “the progress of the armies, navies and air forces of the United Nations has already 
opened great areas to peaceful intercourse which has been closed for more than four black years. 525 
We can soberly hope that all Europe will be claimed for civilization before many months have 
passed.”83 He went on to reference Paris and said, “at that time, however, air commerce was in 
its infancy. Now it has reached maturity and is a pressing necessity.”84 The convention was truly 
remarkable for a wartime gathering, as it brought together countries from around the world—
some in total disrepair—and invited innovation and collaboration to create the future of the 530 
industry.  
The invitation to the convention allowed a preview of the discussions to come. The three 
objectives were to establish “provisional world route arrangements by general agreement,” 
“grant the landing and transit rights” that would be used to conduct the air services designed, 
establish a temporary governing body to manage the transition to the new form of worldwide 535 
aviation, and ultimately transition that temporary body into a permanent one that would provide 
recommendations on economic and technological regulations.85 The routes created through that 
first objective were not to be permanent or binding, however. In the invitation, the Department of 
State wrote that the convention would provide for “the early establishment of international air 
routes and services for operation in and to areas now freed from danger of military interruption” 540 
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during the transition to a new aviation landscape.86 Temporary routes gave the international 
community a chance to create new regulations once the permanent governing body was created, 
but control growth of aviation in the interim. 
At the same session as Berle’s election as conference president and the opening of the 
festivities by President Roosevelt, delegates were greeted with the formal agenda for the 545 
conference.87 First up was the establishment of temporary air routes, including the right to land 
for technical reasons and carry passengers from one domestic point to another within the same 
state. The second agenda point was around the technical standards that would govern worldwide 
aviation. Not only would this cover technical details around how to fly aircraft, but it also would 
address new issues raised by the increased use of civil aircraft, like customs and entry points. 550 
Third was the multilateral treaty that would eventually govern all international civil aviation, 
looking at not only the rights given to each country, but also to the structure of the governing 
body that would come to be known as the International Civil Aviation Organization. Finally, the 
conference would establish an interim council designed to manage the transitional phase of 
worldwide aviation. 555 
We have already discussed the presence of two proposals: the British white paper and the 
United States’ summary of objectives. Two other groups brought their own full drafts of a 
convention to the table as well; one, a joint proposal from Australia and New Zealand, and the 
other, a full draft from the Canadians. The Australian and New Zealand proposal was introduced 
during a meeting of the full convention and argued for near-complete internationalization of air 560 
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traffic; it was quickly disregarded by most delegations.88 Canada had been growing concerned 
about their southern neighbor’s rapid technological and economic growth in aviation and was 
looking for ways to keep up in the 1930s and 1940s. Despite a strategic geographical and 
political position on the world stage, Canadian interests had been put to the side during the war 
to such an extent that they were left out of war support boards in the latter stages of the fight.89 565 
The first step for Canadian protectionism was the calling of an informal commonwealth 
conference to establish a joint position on the status of aviation in the future world order. 
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, among other commonwealth members not 
inclusive of the United Kingdom itself, all met in February 1944 to discuss the needs of the 
lessor commonwealth nations.90  570 
Canadians, ever the diplomats, found themselves in a sticky situation when the British 
expected Canada to follow their policy to the letter and support their proposal at the international 
conference. In the weeks before the gathering in Chicago, the major players in commonwealth 
civil aviation summoned their delegations to Canada for a pre-conference meeting to align policy 
stances. Unfortunately, the end result was “a blaze of glory” and nothing more than three memos 575 
with vague positions detailing certain freedoms granted to sovereign states regarding their usage 
of the air.91 Beginning with the informal talks and ending with the disaster pre-conference 
meeting, the Canadians had always sought “the twin pillars of international co-operation and 
independence of action” for the Canadian people.92 To this end, the Canadians prepared their 
own draft of the Chicago Convention that was designed to be an international compromise. It 580 
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was in this vein that the Canadian draft toed the line between their own interests (thereby 
incorporating the opinions of their allies to the south), the interests of the commonwealth, and 
most importantly, the international nature of the conference.93  
 The four agenda items were complex and broad topics. In order to address all of the 
necessary requirements, the conference was structured around four substantive committees: the 585 
Multilateral Aviation Convention and International Aeronautical Body committee, the Technical 
Standards and Procedures committee, the Provisional Air Routes committee, and the Interim 
Council committee. In addition, Berle convened the Executive Committee to act as the guiding 
hand for the conference’s rules, procedures, and overall goals. Berle selected himself to lead this 
steering committee, as it was also known, which also included delegates from Afghanistan, 590 
Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, the Netherlands, Norway, the United 
Kingdom, and Uruguay, representing 5 of the world’s 7 continents.94 The notable exclusion from 
this steering committee was Australia and New Zealand. While there was plenty of 
commonwealth representation on the committee with the United Kingdom and Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand had brought their own draft of a proposal to the convention, yet there were no 595 
delegates from those states or the southern Pacific region at all. The executive committee made 
very few decisions throughout the conference, but their first meeting established the modus 
operandi of the conference. The committee decided that “as many sessions as possible [be] open 
to the press,” giving transparency to the outcomes of the conference. As a consequence, there 
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were nearly-daily dispatches around the world, notably in the New York Times and the London 600 
Bulletin.95 
Despite this commitment to transparency, the executive committee wanted the 
convention to move quickly and not devolve into a screaming match like the commonwealth 
conference had. As such, it made many subcommittee meetings private to facilitate intimate 
discussions of sensitive issues without worrying about parliamentary procedures and strict 605 
notekeeping.96 Because of this restriction, information known about committee proceedings is 
limited and mostly drawn from the International Civil Aviation Conference Journal. Published 
every working day of the conference, the journal provided the minutes from the previous day’s 
sessions and indexed the agenda for the day ahead. Finally, it tracked every document produced 
by convention attendees and assigned it a document number for archival purposes. 610 
Committee leadership was shared at the second full meeting of the conference after the 
Committee on Nominations determined which delegates should be slated for leadership 
positions. The chair of the Nominations committee hailed from Peru, which as part of the Latin 
American bloc fiercely supported the American policy stances on most issues.97 The delegates 
from South Africa and Colombia were handed control of the first committee on the multilateral 615 
treaty and governing body. While this was a consequential and broadly-defined committee, 
others received more attention because of their controversial nature. The Technical Standards 
and Procedures committee was chaired by the Netherlands and vice-chaired by the Canadian 
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disagreements between the British and American delegations, was chaired by Berle representing 620 
the United States and vice-chaired by the French delegate. Finally, the committee to establish an 
interim governing council was controlled by the Brazilian and Chinese delegations.98  
Meetings of the individual committees began on the third day of the conference, and it was in 
these smaller groups that most decisions were formalized. The negotiations that sculpted their 
work, though, was performed either in informal meetings between delegations or in smaller 625 
subcommittees. In the first committee, for example, the body created three subcommittees to 
address individual issues that were delegated to it: one for the permanent international governing 
organization, one for air navigation principles, and one for air transportation principles.99 The 
informal meetings were particularly important for the United States and United Kingdom 
delegations. The two parties met frequently, particularly during the middle portion of the 630 
conference, to hammer out their differences on the economic issues at hand.100 
 
Drafting the Chicago Convention 
Now that the committees and subcommittees had been established and the proposals vetted and 
disagreed upon, the monstrous task of crafting a new world order of aviation was staring the 635 
delegates in the face. Arguably the most complex, but least controversial, component of the 
convention was the technical work being led by the Dutch and Canadian delegations. The 
leadership proposed splitting technical considerations into eight subcommittees on the functions 
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of flying, with two additional committees surrounding the work of regulatory bodies around the 
world. These subcommittees were:101  640 
1. Communications and airways;  
2. The rules of flight (such as yielding and turning) and air traffic control systems; 
3. Licensing for flight crew and ground personnel, as well as log books for aircraft; 
4. Airworthiness standards for aircraft; 
5. Registration of aircraft in each individual states and how that was demarcated on 645 
planes; 
6. Technical standards for reporting and distributing weather;  
7. Maps and charts; 
8. Customs procedures and flight manifests; 
9. Accident investigation and disaster recovery; 650 
10. Publications and forms. 
Lord Swinton was in attendance at the first meeting of the larger committee and “urged that 
the work on technical notes be complete in order to cover the entire field” and be contained “in 
such form as to go readily into a multilateral convention.”102 After this edict, the committee 
agreed that the work produced must be all-encompassing. If the technical regulations had 655 
loopholes or gaps, the economic war going on in other committees would fall through because 
one of the primary goals of the conference – standardization of technology to facilitate 
worldwide aviation commerce – would have failed and prevented any meaningful international 
cooperation. The United States was recognized as the technical leader, having used civil and 
commercial aviation for decades and encountered all possible problems by the time Chicago 660 
rolled around. Edward Warner, the vice-chair of the Civil Aeronautics Board and member of the 
 
101 "Resumes of Committee Meetings,” Journal: International Civil Aviation Conference no. 4, 20. 
102 "Resumes of Committee Meetings,” Journal: International Civil Aviation Conference no. 4, 21. 
 34 
United States delegation, was a noted technical expert and brought with him 11 documents that 
were not coincidently pre-existing standards for each of the technical areas to be addressed in the 
technical subcommittees. While he noted that these proposals were drafts based on previous 
work, the goal was not to get the specific policies down – rather, it was to focus on “form and 665 
scope.”103 While the forty-four other countries in attendance were given the opportunity to 
provide alternative drafts, no delegation raised their hands and the technical discussions began 
using the United States’ proposals as a framework. 
Negotiations over technical standards was relatively straightforward. Take, for example, 
subcommittee six and their discussions over meteorological standards. While this would become 670 
a significant topic of discussion later on in ICAO’s history, the discussions at Chicago around 
content were, in general, less controversial than the establishment of the committee structure. 
The Journal clinically described the process surrounding the standard definitions of 
meteorological terms, writing “The Subcommittee agreed to clear definitions of meteorological 
terms as soon as possible and pass them to the steering committee for coordination with other 675 
technical subcommittees.”104 Despite the many inherent complexities that come with technical 
definitions, the content sailed through subcommittee and was quickly approved by the broader 
second committee. Mackenzie wrote in his summary of the conference that “the goal was to 
achieve the greatest amount of standardization in international air travel in an effort to make air 
travel as easy and safe as possible.”105 The technical subcommittees finished their work quickly, 680 
and the 18th edition of the Journal included a special agenda item for the Committee 2 plenary 
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session: “discussion of approach to drafting the final report of Technical Committee II.”106 And 
on November 18, 1944, Committee II met for the last time at Chicago to deliver the work created 
over the last 18 days. While the conclusions of the technical committee were not final, and there 
were still issues to address once a regulatory body was up and running, the bare bones of 685 
technical standardization had been created.107 
Despite how quickly the work of the technical committees moved, economic discussions 
in committees I, III and IV moved at a snail’s pace. Committee I, which was focused on the 
Multilateral Aviation Convention and International Aeronautical Body, had arguably the most 
broad and challenging job of any of the four content-based committees. The first, and perhaps 690 
only, policy that the delegates agreed on was brought by India, who proposed that all delegations 
“approve whole-heartedly the principle of international cooperation in the domain of civil 
aviation, and that they express the fervent hope that an appropriate organization to give effect to 
this purpose be established.”108 The adoption of this motion signaled two feelings that pervaded 
the upcoming negotiations: all present at Chicago were fighting for the same end goal, though 695 
the ideals and missions of that goal differed from country to country; and that nearly all of the 
upcoming work would be subject to interpretation and disagreement, even in words that end up 
on paper and seem cut and dry at face value. 
With the complexity of aviation, though, disagreements were inevitable over the 
fundamental rights of aircraft over sovereign territory. In order for temporary air routes to take 700 
off, delegates first had to agree upon rights granted to aircraft of differing nationalities. 
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Conference President Berle was “determinedly opposed” to the “blocs of closed air” that had 
doomed other forms of international commerce, and prioritized the awarding of landing and 
transit for innocent passage.109 Without these rights, civil aircraft were at the mercy of bilateral 
treaties, the same governmental interference that had been at the root of previous conflicts. 705 
Coupled with the right of innocent passage was the right to technical stops and usage of public 
airports on a “non-discriminatory basis.”110 Technical stops were especially critical because 
while aircraft technology had developed significantly since the Wright Brothers first flew, fuel 
loads were still somewhat restrictive and refueling stops were necessary for longer flights, like 
the transcontinental rights that formed the basis of substantial controversy. Coupled with the 710 
right to technical stops and usage of public airports more broadly was the so-called application of 
cabotage. Would foreign aircraft and airlines have the ability to carry domestic passengers 
domestically? And more consequently, would this right be given in perpetuity, or would it be 
temporary until the establishment of the permanent governing board? 
Committee I was assigned the four proposals for review: the United States proposal, the 715 
British white paper, the independent Canadian proposal, and the trunk routes proposal courtesy 
of the Australian and New Zealand delegations.111 To work through these proposals, the 
committee was divided into the three subcommittees mentioned earlier: the international 
organization, air navigation principles, and air transportation principles. Discussions around the 
international organization were centered around the power vested in the organization. Berle 720 
spelled out the United States opposition to any regulatory powers being given to an international 
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organization in his letter to Roosevelt, saying “we simply could not dispositive power over 
United States air traffic to any international body in the present state of affairs” because “there 
was no method or project of creating an impartial body.”112 Instead, the United States wanted the 
organization to have a more consultative role, and one that inspired diplomacy rather than 725 
infighting, and discussion rather than overbearing international regulation. The two major 
powers, America and Britain because of their vehement disagreement, needed to find a 
resolution that both could live with. The Canadian draft proposal had been the working 
document of subcommittee 1, and after progress stalled in committee discussions, the Canadians 
led Berle and Swinton into a private session to hash out their differences.113 Not much is known 730 
about these private negotiations early in the conference, but the Journal reports very few 
meetings took place in the economic committees between November 12th and November 21st, 
when the committees returned with a new structure. 
Clearly the economic factors and discussions were more complex and intertwined than 
conference leadership wanted to admit. When the economic committees met in full after a 735 
conference off-day on November 20th, 1944, it did so in a new joint form of committees I, III and 
IV.114 For the rest of the conference, the majority of economic conversations would be held in 
this new format. John Martin, the chief delegate from South Africa, was selected by Berle to lead 
the new joint committee.115 On November 22nd, at the first meeting of the new joint working 
group, the United States, United Kingdom and Canada revealed their working document, the 740 
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Section of International Air Convention Relating Primarily to Air Transport.116 This document 
formed the basis of the rest of the conference and lay out all of the economic terms for further 
discussion. But to get to this document, there were high-level negotiations between world 
leaders. 
Everyone knew that civil aviation was critical and that, for the future of the world order, 745 
the allied nations needed to agree on the basics to maintain control and order around the globe. 
Berle read Acting Secretary Edward Stettinius into the situation on November 14 and informed 
him of the progress made so far. Berle wrote, “the British, who came with a proposal which was 
not only unacceptable but rather offensively so, took about a week to discover that it would not 
do, and then asked for guidance in the revised proposal which they are prepared to submit.”117 750 
The original proposal referenced, if course, was the white paper brought to the conference, and 
the “revised” proposal was in essence the Canadian document. After three weeks of discussions 
and negotiations, Berle thought the group was nearing a deal. “We are nearing the climax,” he 
wrote in the same letter to Stettinius, and “I still hope to end this conference in ten days but it 
may run over by a little.”118 Unfortunately, this prediction was not to be.  755 
The Canadian proposal had objectionable components to both sides. For the United 
States, the international organization had way too much power without enough national 
sovereignty. Article I of the Canada draft, which discussed the international governing authority, 
gave the so-called “International Authority” seven explicit powers. While there were some areas 
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where all sides were in agreement, like standardized technical regulations and the continued 760 
separation of civil and military aviation, there were two clauses that gave the United States 
pause: “to ensure that, so far as possible, international air routes and services are divided fairly 
and equitably between the various member states, and to ensure every state the opportunity of 
participating in international airline operation in accordance with its needs for air transportation 
service,” and “to avoid the development of economically wasteful competitive practices.”119 765 
Over the course of early negotiations, this dispute got worked out, with the United States 
agreeing to a more powerful organization that could allocate routes, in exchange for the so-called 
“fifth freedom” traffic. But even this bargain was not to last more than a week. By November 
20th, negotiations had fallen apart again because of disputes over how to measure international 
traffic, and it looked like the conference would fall apart without an agreement. 770 
In a last ditch effort to secure a deal between the two major powers, and thereafter the 
rest of the world, on civil aviation, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill exchanged 
multiple telegrams during the conference’s slow period on the weekend of November 18th. At 
issue was the balance of traffic between countries – were larger countries hamstrung by the 
amount of traffic the smaller countries could garner on their airlines, or could they maintain 775 
levels profitable given the size of their country? Said a different way, were airlines forced to split 
routes, like New York to London, evenly with the national airline of the landing country? 
President Roosevelt was not going to let this issue diminish the possibility of the conference 
failing to reach an agreement, so he put the onus on him and Churchill to work out a deal more 
agreeable to both sides. 780 
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The aviation conference is at an impasse because of a square issue between our people 
and yours. We have met you on a number of points, notably an arrangement for 
regulation of rates and an arrangement by which the number of planes in the air shall be 
adjusted to the amount of traffic. This is as far as I can go. In addition, your people are 
now asking limitations on the number of planes between points regardless of the traffic 785 
offering. This seems to me a form of strangulation. It has been a cardinal point in 
American policy throughout that the ultimate judge should be the passenger and the 
shipper. The limitations now proposed would, I fear, place a dead hand on the use of the 
great air trade routes. You don’t want that any more than I do. 
The issue will be debated tomorrow. I hope you can get into this yourself and give 790 
instructions, preferably by telephone, to your people in Chicago so that we can arrange, if 
possible, to agree. It would be unfortunate indeed if the conference broke down on this 
issue.120 
In response to the above, Churchill called Roosevelt’s bluff, saying that the United 
Kingdom had “gone to the limit of concession in this draft” in allowing a higher level of fifth 795 
freedom traffic to proceed if demand allows it.121 In closing, Churchill played his trump card: the 
willingness to walk away. He wrote, “if you cannot confirm the agreement reached on November 
17, the Conference should finalise the valuable technical agreements which have been arrived at, 
and that the rest of the matters should be adjourned for a period during which we can consider 
the matter at greater length and see whether we can arrive at some solution of the problem.”122 800 
The United Kingdom would almost surely have preferred this outcome rather than providing 
more unilateral concessions, like the United States was asking for. A return to the status quo 
would allow British airlines to rebuild their strength and civil aviation capacities in the post-war 
years before reopening and encouraging civil aviation growth. Roosevelt, seeking to strengthen 
the American grip on economic domination in the immediate post-war years, broke out his 805 
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strongest negotiation tool: the lend-lease aid that epitomized British reliance on American 
resources in the war. A telegram to Churchill from Roosevelt did not directly threaten the 
economic aid, but certainly showed Churchill that he was on thin ice if the delegates at Chicago 
failed to reach an agreement.  
We are doing our best to meet your Lend-Lease needs. We will face Congress on that 810 
subject in a few weeks and it will not be in a generous mood if it and the people feel that 
the United Kingdom has not agreed to a generally beneficial air agreement. They will 
wonder about the chances of our two countries, let alone any others, working together to 
keep the peace if we cannot even get together on an aviation agreement.123 
As the discussion between world leaders was ongoing over and above the heads of the 815 
delegates, they continued to meet as a combined economic committee to make progress toward a 
final agreement. A New York Times article noted that “despite the incomplete nature of the 
agreement, it was regarded as representing an important step forward from the seventeenth 
century idea of trade monopolies, East and West India companies and wars between great 
powers for control of sea commerce.”124 Because the majority of negotiation occurred behind 820 
closed doors, the minutes and records of the joint committee meetings are notably brief. On 
November 29th, the American and British delegations submitted yet another draft of their 
proposals. The most notable change was ultimately carried through to the final draft of the 
Chicago Convention: the separation of the freedoms from the convention itself. Though they 
were functionally connected and a near necessity, signing the two documents that listed the five 825 
freedoms would not be a mandatory part of joining the new aviation world; rather, they would 
only be required to ascertain the fifth freedom rights that so many countries had been outspoken 
about wanting. The French delegate even went so far as to suggest that the debate was more “a 
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matter of form rather than substance.”125 The Americans, who proposed the idea in the first 
place, suggested that “a major part of the work of the proposed International Civil Aviation 830 
Organization will grow out of the separate International Air Transport Agreement.”126 This new 
form of an agreement allowed countries to set aside their differences and agree, at least 
temporarily, on a new order of the air. 
After a great deal of diplomatic wrangling and pressure campaigning, an agreement was 
reached. The British plan, “one of limitation,” was on the table against the American plan, which 835 
allowed for countries and their airlines to spin up new air capacity.127 Berle described the 
following debate as “dramatic and somewhat unexpected.”128 The proposals were put toe to toe 
and ultimately the United States draft won out with a few modifications. One of the concessions 
made by the United States, in order to get any agreement signed, was to defer the controversial 
changes that the British vehemently objected to until the new provisional body. Until a 840 
permanent council was established, the prominent economic issues – rate control, route 
allocations, and other regulations that put more control in the hands of the disassociated 
international body – would remain unregulated by the provisional governor of the air.129 When it 
came time to sign the papers produced throughout the conference, the fifty-two countries present 
had a couple of choices to make. The core document produced at Chicago, the Convention on 845 
International Civil Aviation Done at Chicago, contained the broad-strokes details of civil 
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aviation and its ongoing governance, including details on the provisional and permanent council 
and assembly structure. A similar interim document was prepared for signatures that would serve 
as a temporary ratification. The British had proposed and prepared a document that granted the 
first two freedoms of the air, that of transit, technical, and emergency stops, and nothing more, 850 
leaving the opportunity for bilateral agreements between countries as an option. This document 
was called the International Air Services Transit Agreement. In a similar vein, the United States 
had prepared a document for those countries agreeing to award the five freedoms multilaterally. 
This treaty was entitled the International Air Transport Agreement. Finally, different countries, 
including the United States, had prepared various bilateral agreements to secure some variation 855 
of the five freedoms that would last until the permanent ICAO was established. 
 
The Five (or Nine) Freedoms 
The economic decisions made at Chicago revolved mainly around the idea of aviation freedoms. 
How would nations and their airlines be able to access air resources of other countries, and 860 
would those rights be consistent? In order to understand the views of the various countries and 
proposals at Chicago, one must possess a fundamental understanding of the different freedoms 
that have become a crucial component of international aviation today. The diagram below 
provides a visual representation of the different freedoms.130 While freedoms one through five 
are formally documented in widely respected and ratified international treaties, the higher-order 865 
freedoms are much less common and are given usually through bilateral or multilateral treaties 
between states. The ICAO barricades the legal interpretation of these freedoms behind an 
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expensive manual that it refuses to publish digitally for reasons unbeknownst to the author, but 
provides a less-than-helpful summary of freedoms on their website.131 Each freedom is 
accompanied by a diagram that visually explains how each freedom operates. Circle A, displayed 870 
in blue, represents the home state of the aircraft. Circle B and Circle C, colored red and yellow, 
represent two different foreign nations where the aircraft is not registered. Finally, the lines and 






The first two freedoms are derived from the Chicago Convention itself, but included in the 
separate International Air Services Transit Agreement. The concept of the first freedom is almost 880 
a counteraction of sovereignty of the air, yet is essential for the practice of civil aviation. It 
grants other contracting states “the privilege to fly across [each other’s] territory without 
landing.” In effect, this allows both scheduled and non-scheduled civil aviation to use the 
airspace above any party to the convention without discrimination, subject to the technical rules 
and limitations placed on all states by the Chicago Convention itself. The second freedom is 885 
similar to the first, but instead grants the privilege to land in foreign territory for reasons not 
relating to commerce. This is the so-called technical stop rule, allowing planes to stop for an 
emergency or refueling as necessary so long as they do not leave people or goods behind. These 
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two rules coupled together form the basis for all of international aviation, as without them, 
planes could not cross international borders or complete long-haul flights without substantial 890 
negotiation between states. 
 
Freedoms three through five are designed to allow civil aviation to operate as an economic tool. 
Where the first two freedoms supported the operation of flights across borders, these allow 
currency, goods, and services to operate freely between signatory nations. They were also 895 
established at Chicago in 1944 as part of the International Air Transport Agreement. The third 
and fourth freedoms are generally granted together, for they are near worthless when standing 
alone. The third freedom allows an aircraft to fly from its home state and land in a sovereign 
nation for the purpose of scheduled civil aviation. The fourth freedom allows the same aircraft to 
take off from the foreign nation in which it landed and return to its home state. Finally, the fifth 900 
freedom advances the principles granted in freedoms three and four and gives the same abilities 




The ICAO specifically does not acknowledge the freedoms beyond five as official freedoms, 905 
largely because they were not established by an international treaty and are not universally 
accepted in the present day. However, they are still important and derive their structure from the 
first five that were established at Chicago. The sixth freedom grants the power to fly passengers 
and goods from one country to another via the aircraft’s home country, and is a cornerstone of 
modern scheduled commercial air travel. The seventh, eighth, and ninth are much less common 910 
because of their permissiveness. The most well-known example is the European Union’s unified 
airspace treaty, though Australia and New Zealand also exchange these rights.132 In essence, 
these three rights give airlines the ability to commandeer traffic from other countries for their 
own gain. The seventh freedom allows a flight to be operated between two foreign nations 
without continuing onto the aircraft’s home nation. The eighth freedom allows a foreign aircraft 915 
to complete a domestic leg before connecting onto its home nation, and the ninth allows a 
foreign aircraft to complete a domestic flight without any intent to return to its home nation.  
These nine freedoms got their start at the Chicago Convention, and without their indoctrination 
into law they would not be powering the modern-day aviation system. 
 920 
 
Where Chicago Landed 
The Preamble of the Convention on International Civil Aviation Done at Chicago 
summarizes just how powerful, impactful, and timely the work done at Chicago was: 
Whereas the future development of international civil aviation can greatly help to create 925 
and preserve friendship and understanding among the nations and peoples of the world, 
yet its abuse can become a threat to the general security; and  
 
132 Wendover Productions, “The Five Freedoms of Aviation,” accessed December 3, 2020, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=thqbjA2DC-E. 
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Whereas it is desirable to avoid friction and to promote that cooperation between nations 
and peoples upon which the peace of the world depends; 
Therefore, the undersigned governments having agreed on certain principles and 930 
arrangements in order that international civil aviation may be developed in a safe and 
orderly manner and that international air transport services may be established on the 
basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and economically; 
Have accordingly concluded this convention to that end.133 
The governments of the world, even at a time of great conflict, saw it necessary to 935 
convene a massive gathering of some of the world’s top diplomats and technical experts to 
regulate a growing field that would bring peace and prosperity to the entire world. The leaders of 
air commerce in the United States and United Kingdom believed, justly, that the world needed an 
organization to ensure the freedom of access to the year for decades to come. 
Even before Chicago, the people of the world needed to determine what truly mattered for the 940 
post-war good of humanity. To preserve peace, yet still take advantage of the power that control 
of the air provides, a very fine line had to be toed. It would be wrong to take away the 
sovereignty of territorial air. Nations owned the territory above as they owned the territory 
below. Article 1, just as in the Paris Convention issued 25 years before it, gave “complete and 
exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.”134 At the same time, mechanisms had 945 
to be created to allow for access to that sovereign territory fairly and equitably. 
Civil aviation is the peaceful transport of people and goods via the air. In order to 
preserve the integrity of the air, the authors prevented signatories from using “civil aviation for 
any purpose inconsistent with the aims of this Convention,” referring to “preserving friendship 
and understanding.”135 The transport of military goods, or conducting war through the air, was 950 
 
133 World Intellectual Property Organization, “Convention on International Civil Aviation Done at Chicago on the 
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not tolerated. The powers of civil aviation had to be used for good, and to allow for the equitable 
access that was desired by all states in various forms, there had to be a fundamental 
understanding of what civil aviation was.  
The mechanisms developed to deal with the diametrically opposed forces—the complete 
and total sovereignty of the air put up against the necessity of free access and use of that very 955 
same airspace—were ingenious and ensured the air travel that future generations would rely on 
to share messages, ideas, and goods with each other would remain protected. Article 7 allowed 
each state the right to deny domestic travel by foreign aircraft, provided that they did not “enter 
into any arrangements which specifically grant any such privilege to any other State or an airline 
of any other State.”136 Giving control of the air to the states, but forcing non-discrimination 960 
clauses upon sovereign airspace, ensured that the colonial-era conflicts over sea rights could not 
occur with a substantially more powerful mode of transport. Gone were the days of bilateral 
treaties and strong alliances controlling the fate of the world; now, the power rested in the hands 
of all nations to expand their air power and connect the citizens of each state to the world more 
broadly. Now there would be a single international convention governing how pilots would be 965 
licensed, how aviators would fly over mountain ranges, and so many more policies and 
procedures necessary for conducting free flight between nations.  
The Chicago Convention even thought ahead to situations nobody could have dreamt of 
in 1944. Article 9 anticipates various isolated national incidents that could justify the disruption 
of international air commerce, noting:  970 
Each contracting state reserves also the right, in exceptional circumstances or during a 
period of emergency, or in the interest of public safety, and with immediate effect, 




condition that such restriction or prohibition shall be applicable without distinction of 
nationality to aircraft of all other States.137 975 
The incidents of September 11, 2001 and their fallout is likely the most memorable 
implementation of this power. Over the course of just two hours, the United States closed its 
airspace, diverted dozens of en-route flights to Canada, and prevented all civil aviation from 
taking place in its airspace for more than two days.138 But the civil aviation treaty held its 
ground, because it had the foresight to write the language enabling such a move. Supplementing 980 
the original treaty language was the council of states, made up of the leaders in civil aviation 
from multiple groups, and an assembly of all signatory states. The design of the ICAO, combined 
with its timeless and astute language, fulfill the goals spelled out in the preamble. 
It is on occasion necessary, for the good of humanity, to set aside differences and 
formulate ideas that change the future of the global society. The gathering at Chicago on 985 
November 1, 1944, which numbered nearly one thousand strong, is proof that these shared goals 
are always achievable with grit, diplomacy, and a commitment to doing what is right rather than 
what is politically expedient. On Thursday, December 7, 1944, the representatives of 54 
countries signed onto the future of aviation to ensure that conversations like the one above and 
the one below can still occur today. 990 
128.800 MHz: Boston Logan International Airport Tower 
TK82: “Boston tower, Turkish 82 holding short runway one-five right.” 
KBOS Tower: "Turkish 82, good evening. line up and wait runway one-five right." 
TK82: "Line up and wait runway one-five right, Turkish 82." 
 
137 World Intellectual Property Organization, “Convention on International Civil Aviation.” 




KBOS Tower: "Turkish 82, winds from two-one-zero at nine gusting to one-eight, cleared for 995 
takeoff runway one-five right." 
TK82: "Cleared for takeoff, Turkish 82." 
KBOS Tower: "Turkish 82 contact departure one-three-three decimal zero, have a safe flight." 
TK82: “One-three-three decimal zero for Turkish 82, good night.”  
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